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INTRODUCTION
The television landscape is changing. New entrants in
the form of Online Video Distributors (“OVDs”) 1 like Netflix,
Hulu, Amazon, and Apple, are beginning to take on the
incumbent Multichannel Video Programming Distributors
most
notably
Comcast,
Charter
(“MVPDs”) 2,
Communications, and Cox Communications. The consumer
market for OVDs has only recently taken hold, but the
business model’s viability has led to a vast number of market
entrants. This demonstrates the lucrativeness of the service, 3
as well as the apparent threat to the old guard.
Since its advent, television watchers have flocked to
online video en masse. For example, a May 2011 survey
found that seventy-one percent of Internet-using adults have
used online video sites. 4 Nevertheless, incumbent MVPDs
are not taking this change lying down. The OVDs have
forcefully dragged cable providers into the twenty-first
century, kicking and screaming, 5 and these MVPDs have
retaliated with heavy investment in the online delivery of
their normal content through an industry-wide initiative
known as “TV Everywhere.” 6
The MVPDs’ foray into online distribution, however, has
raised a number of eyebrows regarding alleged
anticompetitive conduct.
In June 2012, news sources
reported that the Justice Department began an antitrust
investigation into the conduct of a number of major cable
providers. 7 Particularly, the Justice Department focused on
1. OVDs are “any entity that offers video content by means of the Internet
or other Internet Protocol (IP)-based transmission path provided by a person or
entity other than the OVD.” Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, Annual Assessment of the
Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, 27
FCC RCD. 8610, 8612 ¶ 2 n.6 (2012).
2. MVPDs are “companies that offer multiple channels of video
programming to consumers for a subscription fee.” Id. at 8612 ¶ 2 n.4.
3. Id. at 8720 ¶ 239.
4. Id. at 8748 ¶ 316.
5. Mike Masnick, DOJ Realizes That Comcast & Time Warner Are Trying
To Prop Up Cable By Holding Back Hulu & Netflix, TECHDIRT (Jun. 14, 2012,
7:16am), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120614/01292519313/doj-realizesthat-comcast-time-warner-are-trying-to-prop-up-cable-holding-back-hulunetflix.shtml.
6. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8618 ¶ 21.
7. Thomas Catan & Amy Schatz, U.S. Probes Cable for Limits on Net
Video, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 12, 2012, 12:08pm), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052702303444204577462951166384624.html.
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the anticompetitive effects (in relation to OVDs) of the
broadband data caps set by cable companies, as well as
instances of MVPDs giving priority to their own online data
at the expense of these third party distributors. 8
Inspired by the Justice Department’s investigation, this
paper will analyze whether a prima facie case of
monopolization exists against major cable providers for their
potentially anticompetitive actions against OVDs. 9 Further,
assuming the cable companies’ actions would not qualify as
monopolization, this paper proposes theories by which
liability may be imposed under the Sherman Act, including
duty to deal, 10 attempted monopolization, 11 and tying. 12
I. BACKGROUND
In order to find an MVPD liable under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, an MVPD must satisfy two elements: “(1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2)
the willful acquisition or maintenance of the power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence
of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.” 13 The Supreme Court has clarified that Section 2
requires a monopoly to involve “something more than
extraordinary commercial success.” 14 Further, the Court has
stated in dicta that the Sherman Act should never be misused
to proscribe competition itself, regardless of its severity, but
only to penalize conduct that has the effect of destroying
competition. 15 While this explanation was made in reference
to attempted monopolization, it nevertheless provides a lens
by which to view the scope of the Sherman Act.
The broad terms of the Act do not necessarily lend
themselves to fixed, bright line rules concerning the legality
of a firm’s behavior. An antitrust analysis must therefore
“always be attuned to the particular structure and

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
(1956).
15.

Id.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.C.
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 390
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
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circumstances of the industry at issue.” 16 Consequently,
these broad terms allow antitrust analyses to adapt to the
continually evolving commercial markets. 17
A. Overview of the Relevant Market Analysis
Analysis of whether an MVPD holds market power, and
subsequently, whether it is liable under the Sherman Act, is
based on the definition of its product’s relevant, and
competitive, market. 18 This market definition is crafted
through an examination of both the product and the
geographic market. 19 The difficulty thus lies in defining the
market’s scope. Typically, a narrow market definition would
potentially find any company liable for monopoly, while a
broad definition would do just the opposite, undermining all
the protections offered by the Sherman Act. 20
B. The Relevant Product Market
The process of defining the relevant product market
begins by examining the similarities of the various products,
either by their character or use, or by their perceived
substitutability through the eyes of the consumer. 21 It is far
from a requirement, however, that products be perfectly
Likewise, the
fungible in order to be substitutable. 22
consumer’s use of the products need not be completely
identical, 23 though the way in which the product is used is a
controlling factor. 24 If this use based analysis were not
followed, only perfectly fungible products could be said to
compete in the same relevant market, making monopolists of
16. Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 411 (2004).
17. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 386.
18. Id. at 393.
19. T. Harris Young & Assoc., Inc. v. Marquette Elec., Inc., 931 F.2d 816,
823 (11th Cir. 1991).
20. Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Antitrust Law on the Borderland of Language
and Market Definition: Is There a Separate Spanish-Language Radio Market? A
Case Study of the Merger of Univision and Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation,
40 U.S.F. L. REV. 381, 445 (2006) (arguing that narrow market definitions result
in distorted antitrust analyses).
21. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 393.
22. Id. at 394; Telex Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 917–18
(10th Cir. 1975).
23. Telex, 510 F.2d at 918.
24. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 395.
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nearly all manufacturers or firms. 25
Thus, it is important to analyze the distinction between
the use and the characteristics of a product, since a product’s
characteristics could materially distinguish it from any
substitute in nearly every aspect. 26 Courts have developed a
workable legal standard that questions whether comparative
products are “reasonably interchangeable,” taking into
consideration the products’ price, use, and qualities. 27 Any
product that is reasonably interchangeable will generally be
included in the relevant market. 28
This definition of the relevant product market should
nevertheless operate within some limits. Every product can
realistically have a large number of substitutable products,
and the Sherman Act should not seek to protect that infinite
range. 29 “The circle must be drawn narrowly to exclude any
other product to which, within reasonable variations in price,
only a limited number of buyers will purchase.” 30
Furthermore, relevant markets may be limited to a specific
portion of customers, but the limitation must be based “on a
distinction in the product sold to customers.” 31
C. The Relevant Geographic Market
After establishing the relevant product market for
MVPDs and OVDs, the relevant geographic market is then
determined. The geographic market is defined as “the area in
which the product or its reasonably interchangeable
substitutes are traded.” 32 In the event that an alleged
monopolist engages in anticompetitive behavior, the
geographic market is only relevant where consumers are
unable to purchase goods from alternative sellers, outside of

25. Id. at 394.
26. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); see du Pont,
351 U.S. at 394–04.
27. Telex, 510 F.2d at 918; du Pont, 351 U.S. at 404.
28. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4.1.1 (2010) [hereinafter 2010
GUIDELINES].
29. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 415 (Warren, J., dissenting).
30. Id.; see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 52 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
31. T. Harris Young & Assoc., Inc. v. Marquette Elec., Inc., 931 F.2d 816,
824 (11th Cir. 1991).
32. Id. at 823.
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their geographic area. 33
D. Determining a Firm’s Market Power
The term monopoly power has been widely defined as
“the power to control prices or exclude competition,” 34 and the
existence of this power can be inferred when a firm acquires a
“predominant share of the market.” 35 By itself, the size of a
firm’s market share is insufficient to prove monopoly power. 36
“[S]tatistics concerning market share and concentration,
while of great significance, [are] not conclusive indicators of
anticompetitive effects.” 37 Even possession of one hundred
percent of the relevant market does not guarantee that the
firm has the power to control prices or exclude competitors,
particularly in cases where there are low or no barriers to
entry. 38
Barriers to entry are defined as “additional long-run costs
that were not incurred by incumbent firms but must be
incurred by new entrants,” or “factors in the market that
deter entry while permitting incumbent firms to earn
Although anticompetitive conduct
monopoly returns.” 39
exercised by one firm against another may create a hostile
market, this behavior does not itself qualify as a structural
barrier to entry. 40
As a result, proof of a large market share must be
accompanied with evidence of the actual or potential
exclusion of competitors through unnatural or coercive
means. 41 It is important to note that a finding of monopoly
power also requires a showing that one has “the power to
exclude competition from the relevant market generally, and
not just the power to exclude a particular competitor.” 42 On
the other hand, if the firm lacks market power, even the most

33. Id.
34. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (emphasis
added).
35. Id.
36. Telex Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 927 (10th Cir. 1975).
37. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974).
38. L.A. Land Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 6 F.3d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1993).
39. Brunswick, 6 F.3d at 1427–28 (internal citation omitted).
40. Id. at 1427.
41. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (ALCOA), 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d
Cir. 1945).
42. Brunswick, 6 F.3d at 1426–27 (emphasis added).
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significantly anticompetitive behavior would be inadequate to
establish liability for monopolization. 43
E. Determining the Legality of Anticompetitive Conduct
In determining whether conduct is exclusionary or
anticompetitive, it is necessary to consider “its impact on
consumers and whether it has impaired competition in an
unnecessarily restrictive way.” 44 A firm’s intent to defeat a
competitor in an honest competitive struggle is not considered
a violation of the Sherman Act. 45 The true test of legality is
whether the firm’s conduct promotes or destroys
competition. 46
Courts are required to consider the facts as they relate to
the injured firm, the state of the firm before and after the
allegedly anticompetitive conduct, as well as the actual or
probable effects of that conduct. 47 While it would certainly
violate the Act to actually foreclose competitors from a
market, 48 an antitrust injury cannot be established by
showing an eventual reduction in competition due to the longterm effect of the allegedly anticompetitive conduct. 49 Nor
can a showing that a firm charged monopoly prices be found
to be conclusively anticompetitive, as the opportunity to
charge such prices, over the short term, “induces risk taking
that produces innovation and economic growth,” which in
turn leads to enhanced competition. 50
II. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
A. The Duty to Deal
A firm with monopoly power has no general duty to deal
with a competitor. 51 However, “the high value that [has been]
43. Id. at 1427.
44. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605
(1985).
45. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d
1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 1981).
46. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 413–14 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
47. Id.
48. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911).
49. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 337 n.7
(1990).
50. Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 407 (2004).
51. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601
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placed on the right to refuse to deal . . . does not mean the
right is unqualified.” 52 The Sherman Act prohibits the
exercise of the right to refuse to deal when it is used as a
“purposeful means” of monopolization. 53 For example, the
Supreme Court has imposed a duty to deal on monopolists
whose conduct made an important change to the character of
the market, and where that change altered a facet of the
market during a time when the market was competitive.54
Forced sharing and cooperation in the above circumstance
has been found to be “at or near the outer boundary of section
2 liability.” 55 Should there be a need to expand this doctrine
in the future, the Court fears that the judiciary is ill-equipped
to explain or adequately supervise the manner in which firms
should cooperate. 56 The Sherman Act should not be used as a
tool to create competition, but rather, to protect it. 57 Put
simply, “[i]n absence of any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly, the [A]ct does not restrict the long recognized right
of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private
business, to freely exercise his independent discretion as to
parties with whom he will deal.” 58
B. Attempted Monopolization
In addition to prohibiting anticompetitive behavior by
existing monopolists, the Sherman Act also covers the
preliminary steps that would lead to monopolization. 59
Attempted monopolization requires a showing that “(1) [the
firm] has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct
with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous
probability of achieving monopoly power.” 60 Further, this
attempt must happen in the defined, relevant market. 61

(1985).
52. Id.; see United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
53. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 601.
54. Id. at 603–04.
55. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408.
56. Id. at 415.
57. Id. at 415–16.
58. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307 (1919).
59. ALCOA, 148 F.2d at 431.
60. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
61. T. Harris Young & Assoc., Inc. v. Marquette Elec., Inc., 931 F.2d 816,
823 (11th Cir. 1991).
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C. Illegal Tying
Tying arrangements exist where a seller conditions the
sale of one product on the purchase of a second product. 62
The Supreme Court has held that tying arrangements are per
se illegal as they rarely serve any purpose beyond “the
suppression of competition.” 63 Although still per se invalid,
the Court has nevertheless recognized that tying
arrangements could exist for legitimate business reasons.64
Liability for tying thus rests on whether a firm used its
market share in the tying product to impair competition in
the market for the tied product. 65 This can be demonstrated
by a tying arrangement which forces a buyer into “the
purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want
at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on
different terms.” 66 The origin of the firm’s market power in
the tying product, legally or illegal obtained, is not relevant in
establishing the unlawfulness of a tying arrangement, as
liability will be imposed whenever a seller “exploits his
dominant position in one market to expand his empire into
the next.” 67
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
It is far from certain that OVDs or the Government are
able to satisfy the requirements for a prima facie case of
monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
However, given the large size of the top MVPDs, as well as
their control over not only video content but also much of the
nation’s broadband internet access, the repercussions that
would stem from a successful antitrust suit against the use of
internet data caps and traffic prioritization may change the
manner in which ISPs can regulate their own infrastructures.
This change, in turn, would affect not only general consumer
use of the Internet, but the future viability of third party
OVDs. Therefore, the strength of the prima facie case will be

62. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).
63. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305–06 (1949).
64. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 29 (1984).
65. Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 34.
66. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12.
67. In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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discussed below, 68 along with possible alternative courses of
action for the OVDs or Government. 69
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
A. The Relevant Market for OVDs and MVPDs
Pursuant to the “reasonably interchangeable” standard,
it is highly likely MVPDs and OVDs compete in the same
product market—video content distribution.
While the
products are not perfectly fungible on their face, there is very
little differentiation between MVPDs and OVDs. Both
products provide consumers with video content, be it movies
or television shows, and both permit that content to be viewed
on televisions, computers, tablets, and smartphones.
A closer look reveals that the services’ similarities are
more than just superficial. The largest MVPDs, including
cable- and telephone-based systems, offer hundreds of video
channels, as well as thousands of hours of video-on-demand. 70
While a majority of OVDs do not operate using linear
channels, the on-demand libraries of many of the larger
OVDs are comparable to, and sometimes exceed, the leading
MVPDs’ on-demand libraries. 71 Also, much like many of the
larger, vertically integrated MVPDs, the leading OVDs have
begun to create their own original, serialized programming.72
Furthermore, both distribution methods are starting to be
similarly regulated. For example, in January 2012, the FCC
adopted rules that obligated owners, providers, and
distributors of Internet video programming to provide closed
captioning services, 73 demonstrating the continuing, yet
subtle, attenuation of product differentiation between MVPDs
and OVDs.
The strongest product similarity between MVPDs and
OVDs ironically stems from MVPDs’ attempt to differentiate
their products amongst themselves. 74 The recent introduction
68. See infra Part IV.
69. See infra Part V.
70. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8619 ¶ 26.
71. Austin Carr, Amazon Massively Inflates Its Streaming Library Size,
FAST COMPANY (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.fastcompany.com/1830524/amazonmassively-inflates-its-streaming-library-size.
72. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8724–25, 8728 ¶¶ 250, 262.
73. Id. at 8670 ¶ 140.
74. Id. at 8651 ¶ 96.
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of the “TV Everywhere” initiative, which permits consumers
to access an MVPD’s linear video channels and various ondemand programming through Internet-connected devices, is,
for all intents and purposes, an almost identical product
compared to that which is provided by many OVDs. 75 TV
Everywhere is the MVPD industry’s direct attempt to
compete in the online video market. 76 By taking OVDs headon in competition, it becomes easier to draw the conclusion
that MVPDs and OVDs occupy the same video content
distribution market, even if MVPDs argue against being
treated similarly elsewhere. 77
One can also conclude that MVPDs and OVDs are in the
same product market through an observation of consumer
behavior. Reports illustrate that more and more Americans
are watching online video through some form of OVD, with
current penetration amongst the adult population surpassing
fifty percent. 78 Moreover, while at one time people used to
terminate cable subscriptions in favor of free, over-the-air
broadcasters, current trends indicate that consumers are now
exercising their option to terminate MVPD subscription in
favor of OVDs, in what has come to be known as “cutting-thecord.” 79 Some reports indicate that OVD users who have “cut
the cord” now account for nine percent of all OVD users, with
another eleven percent considering making the switch. 80
Finally, the consumer electronic market provides further,
albeit minor, validation of this market definition. Television
manufacturers have uniformly begun to include Ethernet
ports and/or Wi-Fi receivers in their modern television sets,
facilitating the consumer’s ability to access OVDs. 81 While
Internet-connected televisions provide other benefits to
manufacturers, like the ability to quickly update firmware,
these “smart” televisions also include applications that allow
the direct streaming of Netflix, Hulu, YouTube, and other
OVDs, which is strong evidence that manufacturers recognize
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. John

Eggerton, Cable Operators: OVDs Are Not MVPDs,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Jun. 14, 2012, 4:04pm), http://www.multichannel.com/
content/cable-operators-ovds-are-not-mvpds.
78. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8748–49 ¶ 318.
79. Id. at 8757 ¶ 339.
80. Id. at 8758 ¶ 341.
81. Id. at 8757–58 ¶ 340.
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that a shift in consumer television watching behavior has
occurred. Analysts predict that over seventy-five percent of
U.S. homes will have an Internet-connected television by
2016. 82 Further, Internet-streaming boxes, such as Roku or
Apple TV, have gained popularity as a means for those
without Internet-ready televisions to easily access streaming
content. 83
There are indications that OVDs might exist as
complimentary rather than substitute goods, 84 which may
cause them to hold a market classification separate from
MVPDs. 85 Despite the nine percent of viewers that have
already cut the cord, termination of MVPD service in favor of
OVDs remains relatively infrequent. 86 Quite simply, the
recent increases in online video streaming have not
necessarily translated into decreased MVPD subscriptions. 87
The average American watches thirty-five hours and eight
minutes of traditional television each week (including timeshifted television), but only twenty-seven minutes of Internet
video. 88 Moreover, online video viewership is very highly
concentrated as compared to traditional television
viewership, with “eighty-three percent of all streaming
[taking] place among the top fifth of consumers who
stream.” 89 Together, this data indicates that only a small
percentage of consumers are truly utilizing their OVDs as a
substitute good. While there is no hard and fast rule that
permits the determination between complimentary/substitute
status, OVDs can nonetheless argue that the nine percent of
MVPD subscribers who cut the cord is sufficient to
demonstrate substitutability, especially given the relative
82. Dawn C. Chmielewski, 100 million TVs will be Internet-Connected by
2016, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2012, 5:20pm), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
entertainmentnewsbuzz/2012/03/100-million-tvs-will-be-internet-connected-by2016.html.
83. See Will Greenwald, Best Media Players Compared: Roku vs. Apple TV
vs. Google TV, PC MAG. (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/
0,2817,2402133,00.asp.
84. Paul M. Johnson, Complementary Goods, A GLOSSARY OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY
TERMS,
http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/complementary
_goods (last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
85. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8670–71 ¶ 340.
86. Id. at 8721 ¶ 240.
87. Id. at 8670–71 ¶ 140.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 8756 ¶ 337.

ASHRAFI FINAL

2014]

5/23/2014 12:46 PM

FORCING THE CONNECTION

477

youthfulness of the technology, the age demographics of
online streamers, and the emerging technologies that will
facilitate streaming services in the future.
On the other hand, the FCC found that while a growing
number of Americans are cutting-the-cord, another group of
television watchers are merely “cord shaving.” 90 That is, they
are lowering their MVPD subscription tiers and getting rid of
premium MVPD content, like HBO, and replacing it with
OVD content. 91 Reports have estimated the number of
consumers who cord shaved in 2011 at thirteen percent, 92
surpassing the number of consumers who cut the cord within
that same period. Although MVPD subscriptions have been
shaved, the fact that they were still retained may lend further
weight to the argument that OVDs are merely complimentary
goods.
MVPDs may also attempt to classify themselves as being
a separate market from OVDs because, in addition to video
content, they provide broadband Internet service and voiceover-IP. While each product could conceivably be classified in
a separate product market, MVPDs also sell these products
together in bundled packages, and consumers are more often
than not choosing to purchase bundles from a single MVPD in
lieu of separately purchasing the individual products from
various competitors. 93 Also noteworthy are indications that
consumers are purchasing these bundles with the priority on
broadband first, and video content delivery second. 94 Why
then, should OVDs be found to compete in the same market
when they only provide a fraction of the product (and not
even the primary benefit of that product) provided by
MVPDs? A court may find the differences between MVPDs
and OVDs to be as vast as the differences between the nonautomatic and automatic local alarm systems in Grinnell, 95
and such a differentiation may permit the determination that
MVPDs and OVDs exist in two distinct product markets.

90. Id. at 8670–71 ¶ 140.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 8672–73 ¶ 143; Susan Crawford, The Cable Monopoly: Very Short
Summary of 185 Pages, SUSAN CRAWFORD BLOG (Oct. 7, 2012), http://
scrawford.net/blog/the-cable-monopoly-very-short-summary-of-185-pages/1631/.
94. Crawford, supra note 93.
95. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 573 (1966).
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Even if MVPDs exist within this bundled product
market, OVDs may yet compete in a submarket, thereby
qualifying as a distinct product market for antitrust
purposes. 96 Under the Brown Shoe 97 test, such submarkets
can be determined by “industry or public recognition of the
submarket as a separate economic entity, the product’s
peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities,
distinct customer, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes,
and specialized vendors.” 98 The number of distributors that
operate solely as OVDs, the unique manner in which OVDs
can be viewed, the younger and more tech-savvy customer
demographic, 99 and the cheaper subscription fees as compared
to normal MVPDs 100 indicate that OVDs may in fact compete
in a distinct submarket. Thus, attempts by MVPDs to
distance themselves from OVDs to assuage antitrust concerns
might be futile if they still compete in the OVD submarket via
the TV Everywhere initiative.
As for the geographic market, research indicates that
consumers typically shop for MVPD alternatives within the
limited geographic region where they live. 101 Quite obviously,
one would be hard-pressed to find a consumer willing to
relocate his or her home merely because he or she was
dissatisfied with the local incumbent cable MVPD operator. 102
At one time, however, relocation may have been the only
option, as cable MVPDs had traditionally been allowed to
operate their systems as regional monopolies. 103 While
competing cable infrastructures did sometimes overlap, it was
generally the exception and not the rule. 104 Importantly,
96. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Craig Kuhl, Demographics Shifting to Online Video Content, CED MAG.
(Jul. 28, 2011), http://www.cedmagazine.com/blogs/2011/07/demographicsshifting-to-online-video-content.
100. Ryan Lawler, Over 1 Billion (Hours) Served: Netflix, Big Cable, And The
Innovator’s Dilemma, TECHCRUNCH (Jul. 4, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/
07/04/netflix-youtube-innovators-dilemma/.
101. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8618–19 ¶ 24.
102. See In re Echo Star Commc’n Corp., 17 FCC RCD. 20559, 20610 ¶ 119
(2002).
103. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8619–20 ¶ 27; see also City of
Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’n, 754 F.2d 1396, 1404–05 (9th Cir. 1985).
104. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8619–20 ¶ 27 (“Historically,
cable companies rarely competed with one another in the same geographic
area.”).

ASHRAFI FINAL

2014]

5/23/2014 12:46 PM

FORCING THE CONNECTION

479

until satellite television became available in the early 1990’s,
the vast majority of U.S. consumers were left with a simple
choice between their local cable MVPD and free over-the-air
broadcasting.
Starting in the early nineties, with the advent of Direct
Broadcast Satellite (“DBS”) systems, 105 cable MVPDs were
finally faced with a rival that could compete with all landbased MVPDs on a national scale. 106 In comparison to DBS
providers, which are able to beam their transmission signals
across the country, cable MVPDs operate in discrete
geographic areas as they are constrained by the boundaries of
their individual infrastructures. 107 Even today, no cable
MVPD is able to provide statewide coverage, much less
nationwide coverage like DirecTV or Dish Network. 108
As with the introduction of the DBS systems, incumbent
cable MVPDs have recently faced renewed competition from
telephone MVPDs such as AT&T U-Verse and Verizon
FiOS. 109 These new operators face constraints similar to
cable MVPDs, as their range of service is dependent upon the
The
limitations of their telephone infrastructure. 110
geographic footprints of telephone MVPDs almost always
overlap areas already served by incumbent cable MVPDs, but
surprisingly, the telephone MVPD service areas never overlap
each other. 111
Unlike the cable and telephone-based MVPD systems
discussed above, OVDs are constrained only by the reach of
the nation’s broadband infrastructure, much of which is
The current U.S. broadband
provided by MVPDs. 112
penetration is over eighty percent, 113 making OVDs closest to
DBS MVPDs in regards to coverage area by a single provider.
Because OVDs would likely be found to compete in the same
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 8618–19 ¶ 24.
108. Id. at 8620 ¶ 29.
109. Id. at 8622 ¶ 32.
110. Id.
111. Id. The FCC does not expand upon the lack of overlap amongst the
telephone-based MVPDs, but it is likely a result of the segregation caused by
the 1984 Bell System divestiture.
112. Id. at 8721 ¶ 243.
113. Om Malik, Global Broadband Zooms, U.S. penetration is over 80
percent, GIGAOM (Jan. 30, 2012, 2:00pm), http://gigaom.com/2012/01/30/globalbroadband-zooms-us-penetration-is-over-80-percent/.
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product market as MVPDs, a situation arises where certain
market operators offer their product on a national scale,
while others are limited to the specific regions. However,
such distinctions bear little relevance in determining the
geographic market for monopolization purposes because the
test provided by T. Harris Young 114 limits the geographic
market to areas where reasonably interchangeable
substitutes are traded. 115 The reasonable interchangeability
of MVPDs must be viewed from the perspective of the
consumer. In the FCC’s Echo Star merger order, it found
that, in the case of MVPDs, the relevant market could be
limited to a consumer’s household. 116 The normal consumer is
almost always fixed at a specific business or household, and
that region in which they work or live will typically have less
than a handful of MVPDs. Therefore, any analysis of MVPD
monopolization must occur, at a minimum, on a region-byregion basis. 117
In conclusion of the market analysis, OVDs would likely
be found to compete directly with MVPDs in a product market
for video content distributors under the “reasonably
interchangeable” test, but alternatively may compete directly
in an OVD submarket that may exist under a bundled MVPD/
ISP/VOIP market. As for the geographic market, the fact
that consumers of video content are generally unwilling to
relocate for the purpose of changing providers necessitates
that the geographic market be narrowly defined; a
particularly restrictive application of the geographic market
test from Echo Star would limit the market to the home of
each individual consumer.

114. T. Harris Young & Assoc., Inc. v. Marquette Elec., Inc., 931 F.2d 816,
823 (11th Cir. 1991).
115. Id.
116. In re Echo Star Commc’n Corp., 17 FCC RCD. 20559, 20610 ¶ 119 (2002).
117. The inclusion of mobile phone providers (who often impose their own
data caps) and mobile streaming may potentially change the scope of the
analysis from regional to something larger. Current data suggests that the
average American only consumes seven minutes of mobile streaming video a
week. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8670–71 ¶ 140. Despite the
potential for mobile streaming to occur nationwide, this overall small amount of
streaming usage may be insufficient to necessitate inclusion in the geographic
market analysis, especially when there is a lack of information as to the times
and locations where such streaming is taking place.
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B. The Market Power of MVPDs
Cable MVPDs began as regional monopolies, 118 which
created an MVPD market that remains both highly
concentrated and susceptible to a number of anticompetitive
concerns. 119 Although the landscape has shifted over the past
few decades, remnants of cable dominance certainly remain.
In 2010, cable MVPD service was available to 98.5% of all
U.S. homes, 120 and cable distributors managed to retain a
nationwide market share of 46.5% amongst all MVPDs as
defined by the FCC. 121 Given the lack of overlap in their
service areas, cable MVPDs rarely, if ever, compete for the
same subscriber. 122 A similar story holds true for telephone
MVPDs. In 2010, telephone based video service was available
to 32.8% of all U.S. homes, 123 with a market penetration of
only 15.2% amongst all MVPDs. 124 Similar to cable providers,
the telephone MVPDs also do not compete for the same
subscriber. 125
Accounting for the theoretical nationwide coverage of the
two DBS MVPDs, 126 as well as their market penetration of
25.5% amongst all MVPDs, 127 it can be determined that 65.7%
of the U.S. population has access to only three MVPDs (one
cable, two satellite), giving a high Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (“HHI”) 128 roughly equaling 3333. 129 In the 32.8% of the
country that has access to four MVPDs (one cable, one
118. See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’n, 754 F.2d 1396, 1404–05
(9th Cir. 1985).
119. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8626 ¶ 38.
120. Id. at 8624 ¶ 37.
121. Id. at 8672 ¶ 142 tbl. 6.
122. Id. at 8626 ¶ 39.
123. Id. at 8624 ¶ 37.
124. Id. at 8672 ¶ 142 tbl. 6.
125. Id. at 8626 ¶ 39.
126. Id. at 8624 ¶ 37. The calculations by the FCC assume that a hundred
percent of homes are able to receive DBS, though they admit that
environmental factors, such as tall trees, neighboring buildings, and other lineof-sight obstructions cause this figure to be overstated by an unknown amount.
Id. at 8624, ¶ 37 n. 77.
127. Id. at 8672 ¶ 142 tbl. 6.
128. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a calculation of market
concentration used by the FTC and DOJ in antitrust inquiries.
2010
GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 5.3.
An HHI below 1500 is considered
unconcentrated, an HHI between 1500 and 2500 is considered moderately
concentrated, and an HHI above 2500 is considered highly concentrated. Id.
129. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8627–28 ¶ 41.
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telephone, and two satellite), the HHI remains over 2500, 130
still well within the range necessary to raise suspicions about
the potential monopoly power of the dominant firms. 131
Despite this high concentration, the FCC lacks the data to
calculate each MVPDs’ individual market shares, and can
only extrapolate an estimated HHI for various regions based
on the number of competing MVPDs. This current lack of
data permits only speculation about which MVPDs are, or
potentially could become, monopolists.
Further, regardless of high HHI scores across the
country, the FCC, in reference to the analyses of barriers of
entry and MVPD rivalry, has found that the high
concentration does not necessarily raise anticompetitive
concerns. 132 As stated above, the entry of DBS and telephone
MVPDs has reduced regional HHIs, one measure of market
concentration. 133 Despite the FCC’s opinion, an analysis of
barriers to entry seems to demonstrate that the MVPD
market is noncompetitive.
While reports confirm that
competition from DBS and telephone MVPDs has eroded
cable’s subscriber base, 134 it is important to note that cable
providers in total still maintain 46.5% of the market, and the
realistic best case HHI is still in excess of 2500.
Analyzing the various barriers to entry helps to
illuminate the competition concerns in the MVPD market.
Economies of scale provide numerous cost advantages to
incumbent, large-scale distributors, both in regards to content
acquisition and also consumer premise equipment
The capital requirements necessary to
purchases. 135
overcome such hurdles may play a large role in a firm’s
decision to enter the MVPD market. 136 Land-based MVPDs
would be required to invest heavily in infrastructure to
compete with incumbent providers. This is especially true
when most consumers who want an MVPD service already
subscribe to such a service, 137 and where decades of
advertising and customer loyalty provides substantial “first
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 5.3.
Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8626 ¶ 38.
Id. at 8627–28 ¶ 41.
Id. at 8668 ¶ 138.
Id. at 8643–44 ¶ 74.
Id.
Id. at 8644 ¶ 76.
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mover advantages” to the incumbents. 138 New entrants are
faced with the reality that they are not in the position to gain
new customers, but rather, they must win over customers
from the existing MVPDs, which requires not only heavy
spending but the likelihood of an extended period of start-up
losses. 139
Furthermore, many of the largest MVPDs are highly
vertically integrated, creating a slew of exclusivity
arrangements
between
distributors
and
affiliated
These arrangements are difficult, if not
producers. 140
impossible, for an unaffiliated new entrant to overcome. 141 A
review of the degree of vertical integration in the industry
shows that in early 2012, 127 national networks were
affiliated with the top five cable MVPDs. 142 While there have
been some regulations put in place to prevent certain
exclusivity arrangements between MVPDs and their affiliated
content producers, 143 there are no requirements that
unaffiliated MVPDs, much less new entrants, be able to
acquire that content on reasonable terms. 144 The lack of
ability to obtain more content severely limits growth, both in
regards to subscriber base and content libraries, of any new
entrant to the market. 145
The current high market concentration, together with
significant barriers to entry, suggests that incumbent MVPDs
have significant market power, and potentially monopoly
power. An additional factor may give some certainty to the
determination that land-based MVPDs have monopoly power
under the Grinnell definition: all MVPDs are in control of the
broadband infrastructure upon which OVDs operate.
138. Id. at 8644 ¶ 77.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 8731 ¶ 270; see In re Applications of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec.
Co., & NBC Universal, Inc., 26 FCC RCD. 4238, 4252–53 ¶ 34 (2011).
141. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8731 ¶ 270.
142. Id. at 8629 ¶ 44.
143. See In re Applications of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co., & NBC
Universal, Inc., 26 FCC RCD. 4238, 4259–62 ¶¶ 49–59 (2011) (imposing program
access conditions, arbitration remedies, and program pricing limitations on
Comcast post-merger).
144. Cf. United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300, 305 (1919) (holding that a
manufacturer will not be liable under the Sherman Act for exclusive deals with
wholesalers and retailers who agree to the manufacturer’s terms, so long as the
terms do not amount to fraud, collusion, or an unlawful combination).
145. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8730 ¶ 268.
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Further, while all MVPDs offer some form of broadband
service, the data indicates that cable broadband market
penetration is incredibly concentrated by itself, 146 not to
mention that subscribers who have remained with cable
MVPDs despite new market entrants have generally
upgraded their subscriptions to bundled packages that
include digital video, Internet, and telephone service. 147
To demonstrate MVPDs’ monopoly power via the
inclusion of the broadband ISP market, it may be necessary to
use a relevant market definition that is based on the MVPDs’
bundled packages. Such a market definition, which may or
may not include OVDs, has the potential to destroy the prima
facie case at this stage. However, taking into account the
regional cable MVPD’s significant share of the broadband ISP
market, and still including OVDs in the relevant product
market or submarket, the MVPDs may be imbued with the
requisite power to exclude OVD competition via
anticompetitive conduct.
C. The Anticompetitive Actions of MVPDs
OVDs would argue that the imposition of data caps or a
shift towards usage-based billing by a number of major cable
MVPDs, is sufficiently anticompetitive as to be proscribed
under the Sherman Act. In recent years, most major cable
MVPDs have imposed hard data usage caps on their
subscribers. 148 There is also a recent trend of imposing soft
caps, which allow users to pay extra for additional blocks of
data use (known as “usage-based billing”). 149 Of the five
largest cable providers (Comcast, Time Warner Cable, Cox
Communications, Charter Communications, and Cablevision
Systems), 150 only Time Warner Cable and Cablevision have
not yet imposed these caps. 151 Comcast originally had a 250
146. Om Malik, The Continued Decline of DSL, GIGAOM (Jan. 26, 2012, 8:26
am), http://gigaom.com/2012/01/26/the-continued-decline-of-dsl/.
147. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8672–73 ¶ 143.
148. Id. at 8732 ¶ 273.
149. Stacy Higginbotham, Which ISPs are capping your broadband, and
why?, GIGAOM (Oct. 1, 2012, 12:03 PM), http://gigaom.com/2012/10/01/data-capschart/.
150. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8621 ¶ 30.
151. Stacy Higginbotham, Which ISPs are capping your broadband, and
why?, GIGAOM (Oct. 1, 2012, 12:03 PM), http://gigaom.com/2012/10/01/data-capschart/.
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GB hard cap, and has recently shifted to a 300 GB soft cap
with a ten dollar charge for each additional 50 GB. 152 Cox
and Charter, on the other hand, have stuck with hard caps
ranging from 30 GB to 500 GB, depending on the speed and
tier of the subscriber’s Internet service package. 153
Assuming an OVD user watches streaming content in the
same manner as the average American watches traditional
television service, it is possible that these caps would deter
the consumer’s usage of the OVD.
For example, if a
subscriber streamed the highest quality 1080p video from
Netflix, which is comparable (and most often superior) to an
MVPD’s HD content, 154 he or she would be using data at a
rate of 2.3 GB an hour. 155 The average American’s television
usage of thirty-five hours a week would equate to roughly 322
GB of data usage a month, not including any normal Internet
data usage. Including normal Internet data usage, the
average user would likely send the monthly usage well above
the data caps of most users. For example, the average
American watches 8.75 hours of YouTube video a month, 156
leading to anywhere from 0.8 GB to 6.5 GB of data usage
from YouTube alone. 157

152. Shane McGlaun, Comcast Moves to Increase Data Caps to 300gb on
Home Broadband Service, DAILYTECH (May 21, 2012, 9:01 AM),
http://www.dailytech.com/Comcast+Moves+to+Increase+Data+Caps+to+300GB
+on+Home+Broadband+Service/article24721.htm.
153. Speeds and Usage Information for High Speed Internet Service, COX
COMMUNICATIONS, http://ww2.cox.com/aboutus/policies/speedsusage.cox (last
visited Mar. 21, 2014); Excessive Use of Bandwidth, CHARTER COMMC’NS,
http://www.myaccount.charter.com/customers/support.aspx?supportarticleid=21
24#normalusage (last visited Dec. 3, 2012).
154. See Benny Goldman, Dish Network will Broadcast in 1080p, Streaming
Blu-ray Quality Video Now Possible (But Unlikely), GIZMODO (Jul. 31, 2008,
12:00 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5031461/dish-network-will-broadcast-in-1080pstreaming-blu+ray-quality-video-now-possible-but-unlikely (indicating that
amongst MVPDs, only DBS providers have, to date, transmitted video at
greater than 720p/1080i).
155. Netflix Viewing and Data Usage, GCI, http://www.gci.com/kb/netflixmovie-and-data-usage (last visited Mar. 21, 2014); see Janko Roettgers, EyeIO:
Netflix’s secret weapon against bandwidth caps?, GIGAOM (Feb 1, 2012, 4:00
AM), http://gigaom.com/video/eyeio-video-encoding-netflix/.
156. comScore Releases July 2012 U.S. Online Video Rankings, COMSCORE
(Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press_Releases/2012/8/
comScore_Releases_July_2012_US_Online_Video_Rankings.
157. Broadband Usage Guide, WHISTLEOUT, http://www.whistleout.com.au/
Broadband/Broadband-Usage-Guide (last visited Dec. 3, 2012).
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While Cox and Charter both have plans with data caps
above this level, those higher caps (400 GB for Cox and 500
GB for Charter) are only available on their highest tier of
Internet service, which, by themselves, cost a minimum of
$100 and $110 a month, respectively. For all other tiers, the
cap is 250 GB or less. Consequently, across the three major
cable providers, the majority of their customers would hit
their data caps upon any attempt to watch content via OVDs,
as they would via MVPDs. Worse yet, Cox and Charter
subscribers would be completely unable to access over thirtyone hours of content they would otherwise watch, while
Comcast subscribers would be forced to pay an additional ten
dollar fee. The pure limit on usage via a hard cap, or the fee
required for additional usage via a soft cap, has the potential
to substantially impact consumer behavior. The limitations
imposed on the subscriber by the MVPDs would likely force
them to use OVDs as a complimentary rather than a
substitute service to avoid either termination of their Internet
service from providers with hard caps, 158 or overage fees from
providers with soft caps.
In response to these obstacles, OVDs should argue that
the MVPDs are not competing fairly through lower prices or
superior product, but rather, MVPDs are utilizing their
broadband ISPs 159 to unfairly burden alternative video
content competitors. It is important to note that data caps
have spurred certain OVDs to institute changes. Notably,
Netflix has invested heavily in compression technology to
ensure that the MVPD caps do not limit their users. 160 OVDs
could argue that, because these caps are near the upper limit
of the average American’s television watching habits, they
may not be hindering OVDs competition at this very moment,
but nevertheless that certainly does not mean that the caps
won’t be an impediment in the future. For example, while US
subscribers have yet to be impacted, Netflix has been forced
158. Data Plan FAQs, COX COMMC’NS (Feb. 26, 2014), http://ww2.cox.com/
residential/sandiego/support/internet/article.cox?articleId=%7B2fd6ccb0-b13a11df-4be3-000000000000%7D.
159. While this note seeks to conduct an antitrust analysis solely through the
perspective of MVPD monopolization or attempted monopolization, one can
make a strong case that it is the broadband ISPs who are instead leveraging
their monopolies in order to monopolize the MVPD and OVD markets. Such an
argument is beyond the intended scope of this note.
160. Roettgers, supra note 155.
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to lower the quality of their streams to Canadian customers
to avoid their subscribers running afoul of data cap
restrictions. 161 The limitations of data compression and the
perpetual advancement in video quality may one day make
data caps entirely oppressive and thereby relegate the status
of OVDs to that of an inferior good.
If an OVD were to sustain a prima facie case against an
MVPD regarding data caps usage, the MVPD would bear the
burden of proving legitimate business reasons for the data
caps. 162 If that burden was met, the OVD would then be
required to show that the harm to competition outweighed
the pro-competitive benefits of the legitimate business
reasons. 163 For example, in the case of Cox and Charter,
allowing tiered Internet packages with differing data caps
may very well be pro-competitive. This allows for MVPDs to
legally engage in price discrimination, allowing less
bandwidth-hungry users the ability to afford a cheaper plan
with a lower cap, while heavy users could pay proportionally
more for their much larger share of usage. 164 Additionally,
MVPDs are universally concerned with broadband
congestion, and by placing a hard cap on users (or requiring
that heavy users pay more), MVPDs may adequately
incentivize their customers to limit their broadband
consumption for the purpose of allowing all subscribers full
It would be
access to a quality broadband service. 165
seemingly difficult for OVDs to prove that either of these
concerns are illegitimate, aside from the unlikely event
wherein a leaked internal memo from a major MVPD
blatantly states that these stated goals are not their
legitimate business concerns and that the imposition of data
caps is purely motivated by animus towards OVDs.
161. Doug Halonen, Netflix Turning Up the Heat on AT&T, Comcast and
TWC Over Data Caps, THE WRAP (May 15, 2012, 1:52 PM), http://
www.thewrap.com/media/column-post/netflix-turns-heat-comcast-att-and-twcdiscrimination-case-39946.
162. United States v. Dentsply Int’l, 399 F.3d 181, 196 (3d Cir. 2005).
163. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
164. Abby Johnson, Are Data Caps Bad, Or Are They Justifiable?,
WEBPRONEWS (May 26, 2012), http://www.webpronews.com/are-data-caps-bador-are-they-justifiable-2012-05.
165. See id.; see also Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Disclosure, Deception, and
Deep Packet Inspection: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission Act’s
Deceptive Conduct Prohibitions in the Net Neutrality Debate, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 641 (2009).
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Extremely unlikely, indeed, though similar instances have
occurred. 166 Nonetheless, should the harm to competition
outweigh the justification, OVDs will likely overcome an
MVPD’s legitimate business reason defense. 167
The MVPD would also attack the OVD’s assumptions
regarding customers’ viewing habits. While it is true that the
average American watches thirty-five hours of traditional
television a week, it is unlikely that he or she would do the
same if he or she watched television solely through an OVD.
First, the major OVDs like Netflix, Hulu, and Amazon are all
based on an on-demand model, requiring watchers to actively
seek out content. The on-demand medium may not permit
passive watching, much less channel surfing, which could
conceivably result in deflated viewing hours. Second, while
the cheaper cost of OVDs may be a partial explanation for
switching, subscribers who have been willing to fully cut the
cord and view content solely through an OVD may arguably
value television watching less than the average American.
This notion would permit the inference that these viewers
would be unlikely to watch the same amount of television as
the average American. The cord-cutter’s potential television
viewing habits would then arguably equate to data usage far
below any cap imposed by the MVPDs, supporting the
conclusion the MVPDs have not engaged in anticompetitive
conduct. Furthermore, any OVD argument that hinges on
the future anticompetitive effects of data caps may be unripe,
as it is highly uncertain whether data caps will truly foreclose
competition. 168 It is possible that compression technology will
further improve, perhaps massively, so that data caps will no
longer pose any issues for OVDs. Likewise, it remains to be
seen whether broadband ISPs will raise their data caps over
time in step with the average American’s data usage.
A secondary issue related to data caps is that MVPDs
have, in certain instances, discriminated between their own
proprietary OVD service and third party OVDs with regards
to data usage calculations. 169 A Comcast subscriber who
166. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 73.
167. Id. at 59.
168. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 337 n.7
(1990).
169. Ryan Lawler, Comcast updates Xbox FAQ, cuts reference to its ‘private IP
network’, GIGAOM (Mar. 29, 2012, 5:32pm), http://gigaom.com/video/comcast-
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streams video-on-demand to an Xbox through the Comcastassociated Xfinity application does not have this data usage
counted against his or her monthly data allowance. 170 In the
initial documentation regarding this service, Comcast
explicitly stated that the data was not being counted because
it was being transmitted over Comcast’s private IP network
After severe public
and not the public Internet. 171
172
backlash, the service’s FAQ was amended to remove any
Instead, Comcast
reference to a private network. 173
rationalized its decision to discriminate data by arguing that
the Xbox was a proxy for a normal set top box, and thus, the
data sent to it should be treated as if it were normal video as
opposed to streamed video. 174
The likely effect of this discrimination is that users may
begin to favor Comcast’s own service over alternatives like
Netflix once they acquire the knowledge that they can stream
as much as they like through the use of Comcast-affiliated
applications.
Fortunately for third party OVDs, the
discrimination between proprietary and third party OVDs,
unlike the imposition of data caps, may not benefit from
having a legitimate business rationale. OVDs would argue
that Comcast had the power and ability to create or utilize a
private network 175 to freely stream this data, so they did.
Comcast’s after-the-fact rationalization, in comparing an
Xbox to a set top box, may nevertheless pass muster, since
there would be no reason for a device that functions as a
proxy for a set top box to be subject to data caps. Further,
they may present evidence that this private network is

xbox-faq-update/.
170. Id.
171. Id.; Brendan Greeley, Comcast ‘Invents’ Its Own Private Network,
BUSINESSWEEK (Jun. 21, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-0621/comcast-invents-its-own-private-internet (indicating that Xbox Xfinity app
services were being transmitted over Comcast’s private Video-On-Demand
network as opposed to the public Internet).
172. Phillip Dempler, Comcast Changes Language Over Xbox-Usage Cap
Spat: Same Story, Different Words, STOP THE CAP! (Apr. 2, 2012),
http://stopthecap.com/2012/04/02/comcast-changes-language-over-xbox-usagecap-spat-same-story-different-words/ (noting backlash against the data
discrimination by public interest groups and Net Neutrality activists).
173. Lawler, supra note 169.
174. Id.
175. Greeley, supra note 171.
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limited only to the Xbox and Tivo, 176 which are only two of a
handful of devices upon which Comcast’s service competes.
Currently, the devices permit subscribers to access the same
content they would receive through a normal set top box. It
remains to be seen, however, if Comcast will expand the
service to encompass additional content. If Comcast expands,
they may have to defend themselves against allegations that
they lack a legitimate business reason for the discrimination,
because
the
discrimination
may
be
sufficiently
anticompetitive so as to be proscribed under the Sherman
Act.
D. Likelihood of a Successful Prima Facie Case
The ability to proscribe MVPD conduct under the
Sherman Act depends almost entirely on the relevant market
definition. The analysis is challenged by the fact that the
market at issue is in a state of flux, and it is difficult to fully
grasp its boundaries when the landscape is still shifting.
MVPDs and OVDs may exist in the same market as
substitute goods or OVDs may exist in a submarket to the
product bundles offered by MVPDs. Despite the arguable
market definition and any MVPD statements to the contrary,
the fact that MVPDs have instituted their own streaming
services is strong evidence that they are in direct competition
with independent OVDs.
Further, the MVPDs who have imposed data caps are
undoubtedly the market leaders, and courts would likely find
that each MVPD has regional market power sufficient to
place any anticompetitive conduct under heavy scrutiny.
Unfortunately for OVDs, there are clear and legitimate
business reasons for the imposition of data caps, regardless of
the massive harm they may cause to the OVD industry in the
future. There is, however, some shred of hope. The ability for
MVPDs to discriminate streaming video traffic, at least via a
private IP network, likely lacks a legitimate business reason
and may therefore be proscribed. Nevertheless, verified
176. Stacey Higginbotham, He Said, She Said: Is Comcast Prioritizing
Traffic or Not?, GIGAOM (May 15, 2012, 1:17 PM), http://gigaom.com/2012/05/
15/he-said-she-said-is-comcast-prioritizing-traffic-or-not/; Stacey Higginbotham,
The Technical and Legal Realities of Comcast’s Xbox Cap Spat, GIGAOM (Mar.
27, 2012, 12:53 PM), http://gigaom.com/2012/03/27/the-technical-and-legalrealities-of-comcasts-xbox-cap-spat/.
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instances of this form of prioritization have been limited
solely to Comcast’s Xfinity Xbox and Tivo application, and
proscribing the actions of one MVPD may be insufficient to
ease the large burden caused by data caps in general.
Despite the potential for this small (though not insignificant)
victory, it remains extraordinarily difficult to argue that
OVDs would be able to successfully challenge MVPD actions
through a standard Sherman Act analysis.
III. PROPOSAL
Since OVDs would be unable to prove a prima facie case
of MVPD monopolization, there are a number of alternative
theories by which OVDs or the Government could seek to
proscribe the MVPDs’ conduct. These theories include the
imposition of a duty to deal, 177 an argument for attempted
monopolization, 178 or a demonstration that MVPDs have
engaged in illegal tying. 179
A. Duty to Deal
The arguments in favor of imposing a duty to deal face a
fundamental issue: that MVPDs have not yet refused to deal
with OVDs. The MVPDs have unilaterally imposed a set of
limitations for business purposes that they contend are
legitimate (such as preventing congestion and maximizing
subscriber use), which in turn impacts the competitiveness of
OVDs. However, there may be a future cause of action for
refusal to deal, depending on the development of net
neutrality laws 180 and the potential continuation or further
creation of private IP networks. 181 If Comcast allowed others
to create private IP networks over its infrastructure, yet
denied OVDs that same opportunity, a court may infer that
177. See infra Part V.A.
178. See infra Part V.B.
179. See infra Part V.C.
180. Whitson Gordon, An Introduction to Net Neutrality: What It Is, What It
Means for You, and What You Can Do About It, LIFEHACKER (Dec. 29, 2012, 9:00
AM), http://lifehacker.com/5720407/an-introduction-to-net-neutrality-what-it-iswhat-it-means-for-you-and-what-you-can-do-about-it.
181. Matt Peckham, Netflix CEO Takes Swing at Comcast Xfinity Over Net
Neutrality, TIME (Apr. 16, 2012), http://techland.time.com/2012/04/16/netflixceo-takes-swing-at-comcast-xfinity-over-net-neutrality/; Matt Wood, Comcast
has Some Xplaining to do, CNET (Apr. 5, 2012, 11:57 AM), http://news.cnet.com/
8301-1023_3-57410030-93/comcast-has-some-xplaining-to-do/.
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the MVPD’s refusal to deal was being used as a “purposeful
means” of monopolization.
Should the OVDs successfully demonstrate that specific
MVPDs engaged in a monopolistic refusal to deal, a duty to
deal might be imposed either through the Aspen theory 182 or
the “essential facilities” doctrine. 183 However, due to the
history and nature of the Internet, it is more likely that a
duty to deal would be imposed under the Aspen theory.
Under Aspen, the actions of a firm with monopoly power may
be proscribed where that behavior’s aim is to further reduce
competition, and where that behavior is contrary to that
which was the norm when the marker was in a competitive
state.
Here, data caps may qualify as conduct that
fundamentally changed the Internet services market; a
change that only occurred after the acting MVPDs had gained
monopoly power. OVDs are therefore required to first prove
MVPDs’ monopoly power before they can analyze the
behavior shift in the post-monopolized market. To do so,
OVDs would be forced to argue either a bundled MVPD/ISP/
VOIP market or a pure broadband ISP market. 184 As current
data indicates that a significant amount of DSL subscribers
are abandoning DSL in favor of cable ISPs, 185 it is likely that
182. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 603–
04 (1985).
183. In a certain subset of cases, a monopolist’s refusal to deal may be
unlawful due to the monopolist’s control of an “essential facility.” MCI Commc’n
Corp. v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983). Under this
doctrine, unfettered control of the essential facility would permit the monopolist
to extend their monopoly power “from one stage of production to another, and
from one market to another.” Id. at 1132. Unfortunately for OVDs, a couple of
issues exist in determining whether the abstract concept of bandwidth usage or
broadband access would qualify as an essential facility, considering the fact that
the broadband infrastructure itself has failed to receive such a classification in
the past. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S.
967, 1000–03 (2005). First, courts have typically restricted the designation of
“essential facilities” to physical facilities like private railroad bridges or
power/cable infrastructures. Second, it seems logically inexplicable that courts
could or should impose a duty to deal under the essential facility doctrine when
the essential facility in question is simply an unrestricted version of a facility to
which the OVDs already have access. While there remains the argument that
unfettered control of broadband could allow MVPDs the ability to engage in
monopolization, thereby fulfilling the rationale of the “essential facilities”
doctrine, any anticompetitive actions stemming from an MVPD’s ability to
restrict broadband use would, nevertheless, likely be resolved without the need
to utilize the doctrine.
184. See supra Part IV.
185. Bill Ray, America Abandoning DSL in Favour of Faster Cable, THE
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the cable MVPDs, specifically, may find themselves to have
sufficient market power to fall under Sherman Act scrutiny.
Thus, if Comcast, was found to have monopoly power, it is
possible that their imposition of a 250 GB data cap, decades
after the Internet was first publicly and freely accessible, 186
will be scrutinized as having created a massive change in a
market that was once competitive. Should the OVDs prevail
under this scenario, MVPDs may be forced to remove their
data caps and restore the market to its previously
competitive, unrestricted state.
B. Attempted Monopolization
A specific intent to monopolize may be demonstrated by
behavior that, while facially neutral, has no legitimate
business reason except to exclude competitors or unnaturally
grow market share. 187 While anticompetitive actions are
generally frowned upon, the Sherman Act will only impose
liability when the anticompetitive actions have a “dangerous
probability of actual monopolization.” 188 It is not necessary to
demonstrate that the acts resulted in successful
monopolization, 189 but rather, that if the acts were carried
out, they would likely result in a monopoly. 190 Not every
anticompetitive act can qualify as attempted monopolization.
“It is a question of proximity and degree.” 191
Cable MVPDs retain a large market share amongst all
MVPDs. Further, their market share in the two-thirds of the
country with access to only three MVPDs is likely even
higher. Assuming that a large market share is not sufficient
to conclude that certain cable MVPDs in specific regions have
monopoly power, OVDs may attempt to prove that the
MVPDs’ anticompetitive actions make them guilty of
attempted monopolization.
Supposing that the imposition of both data caps and data
usage discrimination is found to be anticompetitive, OVDs
REGISTER (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/01/27/cable_adsl/.
186. Karl Bode, Comcast 250GB Cap Goes Live October 1, BROADBAND DSL
REPORTS (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.broadbandreports.com/shownews/
Comcast-250GB-Monthly-Cap-Goes-Live-October-1-97294.
187. ALCOA, 148 F.2d at 431.
188. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993).
189. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951).
190. ALCOA, 148 F.2d at 431.
191. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 402 (1905).
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would still be required to prove that the cable MVPDs had the
specific intent to monopolize. The cable MVPDs likely have a
sufficiently legitimate business reason for the implementation
of data caps, but the same does not necessarily hold true for
their data usage discrimination, particularly if the current
manner of data discrimination is expanded either in terms of
the scope of devices to which data is freely transmitted or in
terms of the type of content being delivered. Given the
possible lack of a legitimate business reason, a court may
infer that the reason for the data discrimination was to
exclude competitors, and thus, such behavior could
sufficiently demonstrate the specific intent to monopolize.
Nevertheless, a MVPD such as Comcast may argue against
allegations of attempted monopolization by demonstrating
that their data discrimination currently occurs on only two
devices out of the hundreds that can receive Xfinity content,
and the two devices function primarily as proxies for set top
boxes. There is also insufficient data to determine whether
the data discrimination stemming from either of these two
devices had any discernable, negative effect on third party
OVDs. Without that data, it is unlikely that a court could
find meritorious a claim for attempted monopolization.
Non-monopolistic cable MVPDs in regions with high
HHIs may be found to hold enough market power so that any
anticompetitive conduct would bring them within dangerous
probability of achieving monopoly power.
If so, their
anticompetitive actions would make them liable for
attempted monopolization regardless of the effect. There is,
however, a lack of information about the actual market
shares of various MVPDs beyond general, regional HHIs.
Without this specific information, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to show which MVPD would be able to fulfill the
dangerous proximity requirement of the offense, thereby
allowing them to escape liability regardless of their
engagement in anticompetitive acts.
C. Monopolization Through Tying
Assuming that the services provided by MVPDs and
OVDs exist in two different markets, it is possible that
MVPDs would be found liable for tying their “TV
Everywhere” OVD service to their MVPD service. Comcast,
for example, grants users authorization to use its TV
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Everywhere service on a multitude of devices simply because
those users are Comcast MVPD subscribers. The subscribers
did not independently and voluntarily choose to subscribe to
this additional OVD service.
Furthermore, the TV
Everywhere access is exclusive to MVPD subscribers. A nonsubscriber would be unable to purchase the Comcast OVD
service independently of the MVPD subscription.
Finding liability through tying makes the most sense
when the argument is framed such that the OVD service is
being tied to the MVPD service. Other analysts have come to
the opposite conclusion, finding that the MVPD service is the
tied product and the OVD service is the tying product. 192
However, there are a number of reasons why such a
perspective is likely incorrect. First, the TV Everywhere
OVD service cannot be independently purchased from the
standard MVPD service. While this rationale can be used
just as well to support the alternate viewpoint, it is important
to consider that MVPD services were marketed and sold far
prior to the introduction of OVDs. Thus, the fact that MVPDs
were the original product may lend some weight to the theory
that they are the tying product. Second, the companies at
issue hold large market power (and potentially monopoly
power) in the MVPD market. There is little data regarding
the current competitiveness or allocations of market power in
the pure OVD market, so it is unclear if the MVPDs have
gained any market power with TV Everywhere.
This
weakens support for the alternative perspective. It therefore
seems likely that a court would be inclined to look at the
issue from the perspective that cable MVPDs are utilizing
their competitive advantage in the MVPD market to leverage
power in the OVD market, rather than vice versa.
Unfortunately, due to the relative novelty of OVDs in
general, and the TV Everywhere initiative in particular, there
is limited data regarding the competitiveness of the market
and the impact that these potential tying arrangements have
on competition. Nonetheless, if courts find that MVPDs and
OVDs are separate markets, the major MVPDs’ tying
arrangements would be found to be per se invalid. If the
tying arrangement were analyzed under a rule of reason test,
192. Thomas R. Sheran, Is There Competition Anywhere in TV Everywhere?,
28 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 30 (2010).
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the MVPDs would be forced to demonstrate both a legitimate
business reason for the tying arrangement, and also that the
tying arrangements did not have an anticompetitive effect. If
they fail to do so, it is likely that the courts would find that
these arrangements fail the rule of reason test, and the
MVPDs would be found to violate section 2 of the Sherman
Act.
CONCLUSION
The OVDs and the Government may be unable to
proscribe MVPD conduct under a standard prima facie case of
monopolization under the Sherman Act, 193 allowing MVPDs
to continue to act in ways which harm consumers. To prevent
this harm from growing and to maintain OVDs’ continued
viability, a solution may be to proscribe MVPDs’ conduct by
arguing that the MVPDs are tying their streaming service to
their MVPD service. Should the OVDs be successful, MVPDs
would either terminate their streaming services, or, more
likely, permit users to subscribe to them independently from
their MVPD subscriptions. This would be a great victory for
consumers and OVDs alike, as a variety of choices in
streaming providers would greatly enhance competition. The
fact that MVPDs even bothered to set up online distribution
indicates their awareness of shifting demographics , and the
continuing shift towards online viewing. By having their own
independently purchasable OVDs in the market, the MVPDs
have a greater stake in the continued growth of the market.
In turn, they may be incentivized to raise, or even eliminate,
their broadband ISP data caps so as not to hinder their own
future viability, leaving OVDs with their continuously
coveted unrestricted broadband access.

193. See supra Part IV.D.

